ABSTRACT A new multipurpose protection method for numeric data with double capabilities of selfauthentication and ownership declaration is proposed. The proposed method embeds an elaborate right witness, which is derived from (k, n)-threshold method with a specific value of n, into the to-be-protected numeric data to generate the resulting protected numeric data. Once the protected numeric data stored in clouds or private storage space suffer illegitimate modifications by intruders, our method can check the embedded right witness that contains a designed function of self-authentication to alert the data accessor. Moreover, if the protected numeric data are leaked or stealthily copied for illegitimate uses, our method is able to extract the embedded right witness that can be derived from the values of copied numeric data to declare the ownership. Compared with the related state-of-the-art methods, the proposed method possesses the merits of providing multi-protection functions for confidentiality, ownership, and authenticity of numeric data, leaving no permanent distortion to numeric data and having wider applicability for various kinds of numeric data. Experimental results and discussions on several important issues including security consideration are provided to prove the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud data storage has been a mainstream cloud service nowadays. Via the development of such service, the cost of data storage decreases whereas the mobility of data access increases. Such benefits are both much helpful for business resource management and personal data preservation. However, cloud data suffer the risk of data leakage and unauthorized access such that the privacy of stored data would be disclosed to unauthorized parties. Therefore, cloud data security and trust is undoubtedly a critical issue in the age of clouds.
In this study, the emphasis is put on the security of numeric data and a practical technique is proposed for the purpose of protecting such kind of data stored in clouds. Fig. 1 given below shows an example of numeric data stored in Google Drive which are composed of a list of customers' phone numbers. Our method enables such private and important numeric data stored in clouds to resist the risk of being leaked out and plagiarized. Moreover, even when the protected numeric data are unfortunately leaked out or stealthily copied, the proposed method may extract the evidence from the protected numeric data to declare the ownership and prove the illegal behaviors made by malicious users.
Conventionally, when it comes to the security of digital data, the technique of digital watermarking is mentioned. Such techniques embed meaningful signals like a watermark image or a logo into a to-be-protected digital file. When necessary, the embedded watermark can be extracted from the watermarked file to declare the copyright or verify the integrity of the file. So far, watermarking techniques have been developed for protecting multimedia data such as the aforementioned images, videos and audios in the past decades [1] - [8] . However, it is worth to notice that when speaking of the protection of numeric data, watermarking methods developed for such kind of data are few. The reason for this phenomenon is due to the nature of numeric data. For more details, a watermark can be embedded into multimedia data by slightly modifying signals of multimedia data. In this way, the outward appearances of multimedia data are maintained and the desired imperceptibility is thus achieved. That is, the changes caused by the modification occurring to multimedia data are so slight that these changes are hard to be observed by humans' perception. However, such imperceptibility does not exist in numeric data even if the modification is insignificant. As an example, if the value of a pixel in a grayscale image is modified from 100 to 99 due to the watermark embodiment, the corresponding outward appearance of the pixel with grayscale value of 100 or 99 appearing in an image would look the same to human sense of sight. Fig. 2 shows a corresponding example of two sample pixels with grayscale values 100 and 99, respectively. However, for numeric data, 100 and 99 are obviously different numbers even though their difference is one. For example, in a financial statement file recording the annual income of a company as shown in Fig. 3 , the annual income of 100 million dollars and that of 99 million dollars shown on the financial statement are significantly different though the difference between 100 and 99 is only one. As can be figured out from the aforementioned, numeric data are lack of the perception similarity for humans and this is also the reason why it is not easy to develop a practical watermarking method for numeric data. On the other hand, digital data protection methods may be classified into two types which are passive data protection methods and those of active data protection, respectively. For methods belonging to passive data protection, they cannot forbid malicious users doing illegal actions such as copying, pasting or tampering. But importantly, such passive methods can disclose illegal behaviors imposing on the protected data by extracting digital evidence from them. For example, the popular invisible watermarking methods developed for copyright protection belong to such kind of passive data protection methods. As to the active methods for data security, such methods aim at actively preventing protected data from being illegally accessed by malicious users. Explicitly speaking, active methods may forbid illegal or unauthorized access occurring to protected data by applying designed techniques or measures. For example, visible watermarking techniques as shown in Fig. 4 are usually used to actively declare the copyright and such apparent visible watermark may diminish the illegal intention of malicious users. In addition, the commonly-seen id/password measure is widely adopted to filter out illegitimate users for actively preventing the protected data from being possibly unallowable access. As can be figured out, the previously mentioned visible watermarking methods and the id/password measure endeavor to forbid illegal access occurring to the protected data. However, it is known that visible watermarks may possibly be eliminated by watermark removal methods [9] , and that the id/password measure encountering crack is also not news. The abovementioned facts motivate the development of passive data protection methods proposed in this study.
In the literature, a few methods exploring the watermarking issue for numeric data were proposed. Methods proposed in [10] - [14] are LSB-based watermarking methods for relational databases containing numeric data. However, such kind of LSB-based methods work under a hazardous assumption that minor modifications occurring to numeric data are acceptable. That is, LSB-based watermarking methods inevitably cause indelible distortion to numeric data in relational databases due to the nature of least-significantbit modification scheme. To alleviate such shortage appearing in [10] - [14] , the method in [15] embeds watermarks into numbers relying on data distribution instead of only LSB substitution. For the purpose of avoiding leaving permanent damage to numeric data in relational databases, Farfoura et al. [13] and Farfoura and Horng [14] proposed a reversible watermarking method which embeds watermarking signals by modifying the fraction part of numeric attributes with a secure time-stamping protocol. Their methods [13] - [14] are capable of proving the ownership of the database's owner and later the original content of numeric attributes may be recovered after the embedded watermark being extracted. The property of the reversibility developed in methods of [13] and [14] is advanced; however, one shortcoming existing in methods of [13] and [14] is that an attacker may easily remove the watermark by modifying or deleting the fraction part, where the watermark signals are embedded, of watermarked numeric data in relational databases, leading to the efficacy loss of ownership declaration. A content rights protection method proposed in [16] embeds watermark signals into the data statistics of relational database and the embedded watermark can be extracted by referring specific marker tuples of the database. However, such specific marker tuples need to be stored additionally so as to later decode watermark signals accurately. Inspired by the method of Sion et al. [16] , Shehab et al. [17] proposed an improved method which formulates the watermarking of relational database as a constrained optimization problem. Their method embeds a robust invisible watermark into the relational data, but up to five parameters have to be stored additionally for later process of watermark decoding.
In this study, a new numeric data protection method with double capabilities of self-authentication and ownership declaration is proposed. The proposed method inputs the to-beprotected numeric items with the number of items set as k, into a (k, n)-threshold method with the value of n set as k + 1 [19] , [20] to yield k + 1 partial shares. Then take k partial shares out of the k + 1 ones to replace the original k numeric items to generate the protected numeric items, and meanwhile the remaining k + 1-th partial share is kept by a user for later uses. According to the theory of the (k, k + 1)-threshold method, as long as any k partial shares out of the k + 1 ones are collected, the original values of the k inputting numeric items can be reconstructed by the reverse process of the (k, k + 1)-threshold method [21] . More importantly, the authenticity of the reconstructed result may be verified by the proposed method as well. It means that if these protected numeric data are maliciously modified, the user will be alerted that the reconstructed result is incorrect. Specifically speaking, a user may use the kept k + 1-th partial share and the k partial shares constituting the protected data to totally generate k + 1 combinations of k shares out of k + 1 ones. Only when computed results of the k + 1 combination are all identical to each other, the correctness of the computed result is then authenticated. Such value consistency of the k + 1 computed results is further used to develop a resistance to unauthorized copying in the proposed method. The core ideas mentioned previously of the proposed method are illustrated in Fig. 5 . In addition, the concept of the (k, k + 1)-threshold method used in the proposed method, which was exploited for the function of blind authentication in steganography [22] , is related to that of verifiable secret sharing techniques [23] - [26] . The verifiable secret sharing techniques are based on Shamir's (k, n)-threshold method and used for key management in cryptography, aiming at detecting dishonest shareholder who presents fake shares in the secret reconstruction phase. However, it is noted that the proposed method is designed not for key management but for a new security application of numeric data storage and leakage. Through careful planning and reassigning the meaning of the coefficients and parameters involving in the (k,n)-threshold method, a new method with the desired functions in the security issue of numeric data protection is proposed.
Moreover, different from other methods developed under the aforementioned hazardous assumption that the permanent modification made to numeric data is tolerated. The proposed method does not leave permanent distortion to the protected numeric data, since even a minor modification will render the numeric data useless. In addition, it is worth to note that the proposed method is designed to protect numeric data presented on any documents but not to be restricted to those stored in relational databases. Also, the proposed method is essentially not a conventional watermarking technique but a new type of protection method for numeric data.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. In Section II, the Shamir's (k, n)-threshold method on which the proposed method is based is reviewed first. In Section III, the details of the proposed methods including generation of protected numeric data, recovery and self-authentication of protected numeric data, and ownership declaration for leaked protected numeric data are described. In Section IV, experimental results are shown. Some discussions about the merits and security consideration of the proposed method are given in Section V, followed by conclusions in Section VII.
II. REVIEW OF SHAMIR'S METHOD FOR SECRET SHARING
In the (k, n)-threshold secret sharing method proposed by Shamir [20] , a secret d in the form of an integer is transformed into shares which then are distributed to n participants to keep. As long as any k shares out of the n ones are collected where k ≤ n, the original secret can be recovered. The detail of the method is reviewed in the following [19] , [20] , [22] .
Since there are k coefficients, including d and c 1 through c k−1 , in (1) above, it is required to collect at least k shares from the n participants to form k equations of the form of (1) to solve these k coefficients. In this way, the secret d can then be recovered. This explains the term, threshold, for k and the name, (k, n)-threshold, for the Shamir method [20] . Below is a description of the just-mentioned equation-solving process for secret recovery.
Step 3 in the above algorithm is included additionally for the purpose of computing the values of the parameters c i in the proposed method. In other applications, if only the secret value d need be recovered, this step may be eliminated. The proposed method is based on the previously-described Shamir method [20] in which the value of n is set to be k + 1 specifically. By inputting to-be-protected numeric items to the (k, k + 1)-threshold method, totally k + 1 partial shares are generated. Then k partial shares of the k+ 1 ones are selected randomly to replace original numeric items and Algorithm 1 (k, n)-Threshold Secret Sharing Input: a secret d in the form of an integer, the number n of participants, and a threshold k not larger than n. Output: n shares in the form of integers for the n participants to keep. 
Steps
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. 5. Deliver the 2-tuple (x i , F(x i )) as a share to the ith participant, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
the remaining one partial share is kept by users for later process, yielding the resulting protected numeric data. Note that the prime number p used to set up equations (3) and (4) in the following Algorithms 3 and 4 can be adequately chosen for the purpose of generating appropriate values of partial shares with the camouflage effect and avoiding overflow errors in numeric expressions. A corresponding algorithm containing the detailed processes is presented as follows.
After all processes of Algorithm 3 being done, the numeric data are under protection and the correctness of the protected numeric data accessed later by authorized users can be assured by applying the following Algorithm 4.
B. ALGORITHM FOR RECOVERY AND SELF-AUTHENTICATION OF PROTECTED NUMERIC DATA
An authorized user is able to obtain the original values of protected numeric data by performing the following Algorithm 4. Moreover, since there will be C k+1 k = k + 1 combinations of k partial shares out of k + 1 ones derived from the (k, k + 1)-threshold method, all the reconstructed results of the k + 1 combinations will presumably be the same if these k + 1 partial shares are untouched. Such phenomenon is referred to as value consistency which is taken for developing capabilities of self-authentication and ownership declaration in the proposed method. The details of the ways we recover and authenticate the recovered numeric data are described in the following.
According to the mathematic theory of Shamir's Secret Sharing method [20] , only when the inputting numeric items are right the same as the protected numeric items generated by the proposed method, can the computed values of k + 1 sets of coefficients be all identical to each other. Inspired by the fact of value consistency, the proposed method declares the ownership for suspected leaked numeric data by checking Algorithm 2 Secret Recovery Input: k shares collected from the n participants with k being the threshold mentioned in Algorithm 1. Output: the secret d hidden in the shares; and the prime number p and the coefficients c i used in the equations described by (1) in Algorithm 1, where i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Steps:
to set up the following equations:
where j = 1, 2, . . . , k. 2. Solve the k equations above by Lagrange's interpolation to obtain the desired secret value d [21] as follows:
] mod p .
3.
Compute the values c 1 through c k−1 by expanding the following equality and comparing the result with (2) in
Step 1 while regarding the variable x in the equality below to be x j in (2):
whether the phenomenon of value consistency exists or not. The corresponding detailed Algorithm of ownership declaration is described in the following.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF SELECTING CELL PHONE NUMBERS IN A SHEET DOCUMENT AS THE PROTECTED OBJECT
The first conducted experiments using a sheet document stored in Google Drive which records customers' private information including names, member IDs, cell phone numbers, etc. is shown in Fig. 6 (a). In the experiment, the phone numbers are selected as the to-be-protected numeric items as mentioned in Step 1 of Algorithm 3. Furthermore, we take the last three numbers of the phone number as a unit and do so repeatedly and sequentially for each phone number to constitute the input of Algorithm 3. For example, the phone number of ''Steve Rosen'' listed in the second row of the table shown in Fig. 6 (a) is 0913209548, and then the last three numbers 548 of the phone number is selected as one of input items
Algorithm 3 Generation of Protected Numeric Data From Original Numeric Data
Input: numeric data D and a secret key K . Output: protected numeric data D and a partial share S.
Steps.
Stage 1 -transform numeric data into k + 1 partial shares.
Step 1. Select numeric items that are ready to be protected and denote them as a set G.
Step 2. Set Sequentially the selected numeric items constituting G as n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k , where k is the value of the total number of selected numeric items.
Step 3. Choose an appropriate prime number p whose value is larger than values of all selected numeric items n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k in G.
Step 4. Take sequentially n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k and perform the following steps to transform the k numeric items into k + 1 shares.
2 Take x 1 through x n to be the integers 1 through n, respectively, where n = k + 1. 4.3 Generate n partial shares F(x i ) by using the following (k− 1)-degree polynomial:
where Fig. 6(a) , are sequentially selected from other customers' phone numbers. In this case, an appropriate prime number p = 997 is selected which satisfies the requirement mentioned in Step 3 of Algorithm 3. After applying Algorithm 3, the resulting protected numeric data are shown as Fig. 6(b) , and the remaining one partial share, called S mentioned in
Step 6 of Algorithm 3, of the value 896 is saved for later uses. As can be observed from 
where j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Compute the values d and c 1 through
c k−1 by expanding the following equality and comparing the result with (4) in Step 3.1.1 above while regarding the variable x in the equality below to be x j in (4):
] mod p . the same values, take the phenomenon of value consistency as the evidence to declare the ownership of T ; otherwise, T is guaranteed not the copy of the protected numeric data.
Put the computed values
because of the replacement action mentioned in Step 5 of Algorithm 3. After all processes of Algorithm 3 being done, the numeric data saved in the cloud are under protection with a self-authentication capability.
As for the recovery of the protected numeric data, an authorized user is able to obtain the original values of the protected numeric data by performing Algorithm 4. Moreover, by checking the value consistency of the different sets of computed data values described in Stage 2 of Algorithm 4, the user is able to know that the numeric data now accessed are intact or not. In this way, even the information of id and password of clouds are hacked, the numeric data accessed by attackers are not true and so the hacked numeric data is useless. On the other hand, if attackers modify the content of protected numeric data stored in clouds for malicious objectives, a user is able to be aware of these modifications when accessing because of the self-authentication capability coming from the proposed Algorithm 4. As an example, we show a conducted experiment in which the protected numeric data listed in Fig. 6(b) suffered malicious modifications and the modified result is shown in Fig. 7 . As can be observed, three customers' phone numbers have been changed. In this case, since the number of the protected numeric items, i.e. the content of Phone No., is totally 10, the proposed (k, k + 1)-threshold self-authentication method now is formulated as a (10, 11)-threshold self-authentication method. Therefore, when performing Algorithm 4 to recover the content from the attacked protected numeric data, 11 sets of coefficient values will be obtained and then it can be found that the values of these 11 sets of coefficients are different from each other. Fig. 8 shows the computed values of the 11 sets of coefficients. On the contrary, if the protected numeric data are untouched, the 11 sets of coefficient values will be VOLUME 6, 2018 identical to each other after performing Algorithm 4 as shown in Fig. 9 . Again, by checking the value consistency of every set of computed coefficients, the authenticity of the recovered numeric data is thus guaranteed.
That is to say, illegal modifications or unexpected changes happening to the protected numeric data would be disclosed by the proposed method, attaining the security protection of numeric data stored on far ends. The final recovered result is shown in Fig. 10 .
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF OWNERSHIP DECLARATION FOR LEAKED CELL PHONE NUMBERS
Another important capability provided by the proposed method is the ownership declaration for protected numeric data leaked from clouds. If numeric data that are suspected being copied from the protected numeric data without granting authorization, we can utilize the partial shares concealed in the phone numbers of the suspected numeric data and then perform Algorithm 5 to check the existence of value consistency. Such fact of value consistency can be discovered from the computed k + 1 sets of coefficients as mentioned in Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 5. As a result, the fact of value consistency, which is extracted from the suspected numeric data, plays as an evidence to declare the ownership of the illegally-copied numeric data. To illustrate the above scenario, a corresponding experiment of ownership declaration is conducted and described as follows. Now assume a user, say Bob, is the owner of the protected data as shown previously in Fig. 6(b) and he found an unauthorized user, say Alice, stealthily copied the data for her own use. For the purpose of bearing witness to Alice's illegal behavior, Bob is able to extract the fact of value consistency from the stolen data by the proposed method to declare the ownership. Now the data stolen by Alice are presented in another PDF file shown in Fig. 11 . As can be observed, some customers' data in the PDF document were copied from Bob's data as shown in Fig. 6(b) . In Fig.12 , we marked illegally-copied data in yellow of the PDF file for better observation. Then, as mentioned previously, the last three numbers of the illegally-copied phone numbers were actually the concealed partial shares and so Bob may successfully gain the fact of value consistency by performing Algorithm 5 with the inputting concealed partial shares. Fig. 13 shows the experimental result and, as expected, the fact of value consistency was obtained. Accordingly, the fact of value consistency is a credible evidence to bear witness to the illegitimate behaviors made by Alice.
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF SELECTING SCIENTIFIC DATA IN AN ONLINE FILE AS THE PROTECTED OBJECT
Another experimental result was conducted by the use of the scientific data about air compound pollution during four seasons of years. The scientific statistics of air pollution are stored in an online Google Docs file as shown in Fig. 14(a) . In the experiment, four digits constituting each numeric item are selected for protection with a suggested prime number p = 9973. Since the number of numeric items displayed in four rows with respect to four seasons is totally 16, the FIGURE 11. Alice disclosed a PDF file which contains some leaked numeric data that have been protected by the proposed method.
FIGURE 12.
The leaked content is marked in yellow in Alice's PDF file. proposed method is formulated as a (16, 17)-threshold selfauthentication method in this case to generate the protected numeric data. As shown in Fig. 14(b) , the presented statistics of air pollution have been protected and their values are fake now with a concealed fact of value consistency.
If the stored scientific statistics are replaced with counterfeit data by intruders as shown in Fig. 15 , the value inconsistency will be obtained from the 17 sets of computed coefficients' values after performing Algorithm 4. Fig. 16(a) shows the value inconsistency computed from the attacked scientific statistics. Contrarily, if the computed values of 17 sets of coefficients are identical to each other VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 14. The experiment using a Google Docs file in which scientific data of air compound pollution are the protected objects. (a) The original content of the scientific data in which all of four digits of the to-be-protected numeric items are selected for later protection processing. (b) The generated protected data in which the value of every numeric item is different from its original value shown in Fig. 14(a) .
as shown in Fig. 16(b) , it means that the recovered scientific statistics are intact and trustworthy.
D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF OWNERSHIP DECLARATION FOR PLAGIARIZED SCIENTIFIC DATA
An intruder may stealthily enter the storage space and plagiarize the protected numeric data. As a result, as shown in Fig. 17 , the plagiarized scientific statistics are shown as if other people's data in an online Microsoft Word file. In such a case, by using the proposed method, the data owner is able to extract the fact of value consistency from the leaked scientific statistics shown in the Microsoft Word file to declare the ownership and, meanwhile, disclose the action of plagiarism. 
E. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF SELECTING STOCK MARKET DATA IN DROPBOX PAPER AS THE PROTECTED OBJECT
In the experiment, the stock market data saved in a Dropbox paper are taken to demonstrate a successful case and a failure case in self-authentication, respectively. The original numeric data of the stock market is shown in Fig. 18(a) and the numeric items of ''Profit Margin'' are chosen as the protected objects. In the experiment, we leave the decimal fractions of the chosen numeric items untouched and select the integer part (plus-minus sign ignored) of each chosen numeric item into the protection processes by using the proposed method. Fig. 18(b) shows the protected version of the stock market data. As can be observed, the integer parts of protected numeric items are different from their original values, but the decimal fractions are the same as their original version.
For the protected integer parts of the numeric data, if any one of them is modified illegitimately, the proposed method will detect it after performing Algorithm 4. As an example, Fig. 19 displays the attacked result and Fig. 20 shows the corresponding self-authentication result. As can be seen, the value inconsistency is computed as expected. However, if only the decimal fraction of the numeric item is modified as shown in Fig. 21 , the detection of the modification will fail because the decimal fraction of each numeric item is not included into the protection as mentioned previously. Fig. 22 shows the failure detection case in which the value consistency is still computed from the intact integer parts of the protected numeric items though the decimal fraction of one protected numeric item has been tampered.
In summary, the number of digits or which part of a numeric item chosen for protection can be decided by a user. As the first experiment shown previously, the last three digits of the phone number are selected for protection. In the second experiment shown in part C of this Section, all of the digits constituting the numeric data associated with the scientific statistics of air pollution are selected for protection. As for the experiment of using stock market data, decimal fractions are excluded and only integer parts of the numeric data are selected for protection.
F. COMPARISONS WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS RELATED TO NUMERIC DATA PROTECTION
A comparison of the proposed method with four methods related to the security issue of numeric data is given in Table 1 . Among these existing methods, only the proposed method and the method of [18] will not leave permanent distortion to protected numeric data. The reason is that different from methods of [10] , [16] , and [17] embedding watermark signals by changing values of tuples, the proposed method protects numeric data by transforming their values into another ones and afterward their original values can be recovered by the reverse decoding process. As to the method of [18] , since their method merely changes the order of some tuples to embed the watermark signals, the original values of numeric data can be kept. However, compared with the method of [18] , only the proposed method is widely suitable for numeric type of data instead of being restricted to be only applied for numeric data in relational database. Moreover, it is worth to notice that the proposed method is different from methods of [10] , [16] , and [17] developed based on an impractical assumption that to-beprotected numeric attributes can tolerate small modifications. As is known, in real applications, even a minor modification will render the numeric data useless, such as stock market data, medical statistics, scientific data, etc. Therefore, the proposed method disobeys the assumption for more satisfying requirements in real applications. Furthermore, current methods in [10] , [16] , and [17] aim at proving copyright for relational database by embedding robust watermark signals, and the method of [18] was designed for the purpose of tamper detection by embedding fragile watermark signals into database. In the proposed method, we utilize the phenomenon of value consistency derived from the secret sharing method to verify the correctness of decoded numeric data and, meanwhile, take this phenomenon as an evidence to declare the copyright of protected numeric data. At last, all but the proposed method protect numeric data under a concept of watermark embedding; however, as mentioned previously, a little modification occurring to values of numeric data will inevitably render them useless. Note that numeric data do not have the property of perception similarity for human sense. For example, as mentioned previously, you would not say the number 100 is like 99 even the value difference between them is only 1. Accordingly, the proposed method manipulates the protection process of numeric data by transforming them into another normal but fake values to forbid unauthorized users getting the true values of protected numeric data. The true values of protected numeric data may be easily decoded by reverse transformation process. Furthermore, the correctness and validity of decoded numeric data may be confirmed as well.
V. DISCUSSIONS A. MERITS OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
In addition to being capable of declaring ownership and selfauthentication of the decoded protected numeric data, several important merits and contribution first made by the proposed method are presented as follows.
1) Providing three aspects of security protection for confidentiality, ownership and authenticity of numeric data − At the first aspect, the protected numeric data, which are actually partial shares transformed from original numeric data, accessed by unauthorized users are fake for consideration of the confidentiality. At the second aspect, if data leakage occurs, not only the content of the leaked numeric data are fake but the ownership may be declared by extracting the phenomenon of value consistency, which plays as the evidence, from the leaked numeric data. At the last aspect, if unauthorized users tamper the content of protected numeric data, authorized users will be alerted to the tampering attacks also by checking the existence of value consistency computed from the accessed numeric data, achieving the authenticity verification. 2) Leaving no permanent distortion to original numeric data − Though the proposed method protects numeric data by encoding them via (k, k + 1)-threshold method, their original values can be recovered by the reverse decoding process on condition of the protected numeric data not suffering modifications, leaving no permanent distortion to original values of the protected numeric data. 3) Having wider generality for numeric data protection − Different from modifying values of attributes or changing the order of tuples to embed watermarks into numeric data in relational database, the proposed method protects numeric data by temporarily transforming their values into another reasonable value range.
In such a way, the proposed numeric data protection method may be applied for numeric data existing in various kinds of files instead of being restricted to be applied for numeric data in relational database. 4) Providing a new point of view for numeric data protection − The operation of the proposed method does not embed watermarks into the numeric data, but embed a mechanism, which is the phenomenon of value consistency. By checking whether the phenomenon of value consistency existing or not, double capabilities of self-authentication and ownership declaration for numeric data are fulfilled, providing a new point of view for numeric data protection. 5) Getting rid of the idealistic assumption on which conventional relational database methods based − Conventional methods have an assumption that permits The generated protected data in which the integer part of every protected numeric item is different from its original value shown in Fig. 18(a) . unrecoverable value distortion occurring to to-beprotected numeric data though the distortion is claimed small. However, numeric data are hard to tolerate this FIGURE 20. A successful detection case in which 14 sets of coefficients computed from attacked stock market data shown in Fig. 19 are different from each other in value by performing the proposed (13, 14)-threshold self-authentication method.
FIGURE 21.
The attacked protected numeric data in which the decimal fraction of Profit Margin belonging to Japan marked with red rectangle is modified by a fake value.
FIGURE 22.
A failure detection case in which the value consistency is still computed from the intact integer parts though the decimal fraction of one protected numeric item has been tampered.
distortion when considering the usability in real uses. Therefore, the proposed method is developed without following the aforementioned assumption in conventional methods for more satisfying the practical uses. VOLUME 6, 2018
B. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The proposed method encodes the to-be-protected numeric data to generate protected numeric data containing the fact of value consistency. Unauthorized users may aim to crack/decode the encoded numeric data in order to obtain their original values and, therefore, the possibility of successfully cracking the protected numeric data is a major concern.
To deal with the security concern, the secret key K mentioned in Step 5.1 of Algorithm 3 is first used to randomize the order of numeric items selected for being replaced with generated partial shares. Therefore, the probability of correctly guessing order of partial shares values with its corresponding x i described in Step 3.1 of Algorithm 4 for setting up the equation (4) is 1/n!, where n is the value of the total number of generated partial shares.
To reinforce the security further, the proposed method adopts a critical secure measure that is the randomizationof values of x 1 through x n used in Step 4.2 of Algorithm 3. For clarity of presentation of the proposed Algorithms, it is noted that the values of x 1 through x n , which constitute the aforementioned 2-tuple (x i , F(x i )), are set as constants in Algorithms 3 and 4. But in real cases, we choose these values of x 1 through x n for generating partial shares to be random within the allowed integer range of 0 ≤ x i < p with the help of another secret key. In such a way, the probability of cracking the protected numeric data including correctly guessing all values of x 1 through x n and the corresponding F(x i ) in each 2-tuple (x i , F(x i )) can be figured out to be 1/{[p × (p− 1)× (p− 2) ×. . . (p − n + 1)] ×n!}, yielding a small probability in general cases. For instance, now assume the number of to-be-protected numeric items is 10 and so the number of the generated partial shares is 11. Even let attackers know the information of p value set as 101 here, the probability of correctly guessing all values of x 1 through x n used for generating the corresponding F(
, which is very small and leaves an hard task of cracking for attackers.
For more specifically, the previously-mentioned secret key used for choosing values of x 1 through x n is just an integer number which is used as a seed for the random number generator. The Algorithm of using the key is described as follows.
1) Use the secret key as the seed for a random number generator to get a number sequence R = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . ). 2) Take the element r from R in order, and use the following equation to get the values of x 1 through x n for generating partial shares: x i = (r j ) mod 17 , (5) where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. 1) If the computed value of x i is equal to any of x 1 , x 2 , . . . , and x i−1 , discard x i and go to Step 2 to compute another; otherwise, adopt the value of x i as a desired one. In the later decoding phase including recovery and selfauthentication of protected numeric data, the same values of x 1 through x n used in Algorithm 3 can be obtained in the same way.
Furthermore, to estimate that how much time would probably be consumed to crack our method would have reference value. We take the conducted experiment of using cell phone numbers given in part A of Section IV and refer to the content of [27] for illustration. In the experiment, p, k and n are set as 997, 10 and 11, respectively. In such a value composition, the aforementioned probability is 1 748×10 41 ) . Not merely does this probability have to be considered, but the other mentionedpreviously probability of cracking the order of share values with the corresponding x i , which is 1/n!, also needs be incorporated into the evaluation. Consequently, the whole probability of being cracked is [1/(8.748×10 41 
It means that the search space of combinations is 31.746×10 47 . Referring to the content of [27] , if the search space of combinations is 4.40×10 31 , it is inferred that billions of years would be taken to brute force it by a high performance computer with a powerful graphic card and cutting age technology. Note that the search space 31.746×10 47 derived from our experiment is larger than 4.40×10 31 mentioned in [27] . It is noted that the aforementioned is just an example for illustration, and if the more number of numeric items are protected in other real cases, the resulting search space will be larger. Accordingly, the aforementioned time length of being cracked is reasonably presumed to leave an obstacle for attackers to crack our method in a reasonable amount of time even via the use of a more advanced machine.
As to the possibility of incidentally producing value consistency by attacked protected numeric data, since Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme is based on polynomial interpolation: given k points in the 2-dimensional plane (x i , y i ), . . . , (x k , y k ) with distinct x i 's, there is one and only one polynomial q(x) of degree k− 1 such that q(x i ) = y i for all i [20] . In the proposed method, y i is the generated protected numeric datum and x i is controlled by another secret key mentioned previously. Therefore, the attacked numeric data would be with incorrect value of y i , and the information about the corresponding value of x i for each protected numeric datum is unavailable to an attacker. In such a condition, the attacked protected numeric data that can produce value consistency incidentally hardly happens.
At last, Shamir's (k, n)-threshold method guarantees that there is nothing the opponent can deduce about the real value of the secret even if kąÐ1 of the n shares are revealed to an opponent [20] . That is, only when the k shares out of the n ones are collected, can the secret be obtained. In the proposed method, the (k, n)-threshold method is modified as (k, k+1)-threshold self-authentication method and so if less than k shares will be computed together, there is nothing the unauthorized user can deduce. Such a property is beneficial for data security, because if some amount of protected data can deduce, the partial information related to the true values of the protected numeric data may be revealed to the unauthorized user.
C. RELATED ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A viewpoint which deserves thinking about is that what if we convert a document containing numeric data into a binary document image and apply image-based security algorithms, such as image watermarking methods, on it? The corresponding analyses of feasibility and effectiveness are given as follows.
Presumably, by checking the embedded watermark signals of the binary document image, the tampered content of the image can be detected by such kind of watermarking methods. However, it is noted that this way is merely suitable to the condition of a binary image suffering unauthorized modification in clouds, but is unable to deal with the leakage of numeric data that are displayed in the document. The reasons are that: 1. the numeric data displayed in the binary document image may be easily manually plagiarized, leading to the data leakage. Note that an infringer needs not to own the binary document image, but the infringer still can obtain values of the numeric data by directly viewing the image content. 2. Since the watermark signals embedded in the binary document image will not follow the leaked numeric data, the data owner is unable to extract any watermark signals from the leaked numeric data to declare the ownership. Accordingly, when the to-be-protected object is an image, it is suggested that the security signals are directly associated with the information of the image content. Therefore, the watermark signals are generally designed to be embedded into pixels' values or frequency coefficients' values [1] - [4] , [28] ; likewise, when the to-be-protected object is numeric data, the security signals are required to be associated with values of the protected numeric data. That is the reason why we protect numeric data by encoding them via (k, k+1)-threshold method so as to blend the value consistency with the values of numeric data.
Though the numeric data can be converted as the image content, as mentioned previously, their values shown in the image are easily leaked out by manually plagiarism. More, the watermark signals concealed in the image content do not follow the plagiarized values of numeric data and so a legitimate user is unable to extract the evidence from the leaked numeric data to declare the ownership. However, via the use of the proposed method, when data leakage occurring, not only the content of the leaked numeric data are fake but the ownership may be declared by extracting the phenomenon of value consistency from the leaked numeric data.
On the other hand, existing image-based security methods are capable of localizing the tampered regions and even recovering the tampered content. Inspired by them, future works may be directed to numeric data tampering localization and recovery by integrating the concept of image-based security methods. However, based on the present Algorithms proposed in this study, a flexible and feasible way is provided below for partially accomplishing the function of tampering localization.
When tampering localization is desired, we can divide the to-be-protected numeric data into smaller parts for the purpose of reducing the unit of the authentication precision in the proposed method. That is, originally the authentication precision is N , but now we can divide N into smaller parts and the amount of each part is the finer unit of the authentication precision. For example, assume that the number of to-beprotected numeric items N is 100, and now we divide N into two parts, denoted as G 1 and G 2 . As can be figured out, each of them is composed of 50 numeric items. Then, each part composed of 50 numeric items, which is right the aforementioned finer unit of the authentication precision, is input to Algorithm 3 and note that the proposed method now is formulated as a (50, 51)-threshold self-authentication method. As a result, the resulting protected numeric data and two (k + 1)-th shares associated with G 1 and G 2 are generated. As mentioned in part 1 of Section III and Step 6 of Algorithm 3, the (k + 1)-th share is kept by the user for performing Algorithm 4 later. Here the two (k + 1)-th partial shares are respectively used for the two parts, i.e. G 1 and G 2 , divided from the input N (=100) numeric items. In such a way, when a numeric item suffers tampering, the location of the tampered numeric item may be localized in G 1 or G 2 . Likewise, if the finer authentication precision is desired, a user may divide N numeric items into smaller parts but the more number of the (k + 1)-th shares need be kept and managed.
Furthermore, we discuss the variation of the value consistency when the protected numeric data being either increased or decreased. Condition 1. In the case of protected numeric data being increased ąÐ When data leakage occurring, since the k + 1 shares yielded by the proposed (k, k + 1)-threshold method can still be collected from the increased numeric data, the embedded right witness, i.e. the fact of value consistency, can be obtained successfully to declare the ownership. For example, as the conducted experiment shown in part B of Section IV, the protected 10 numeric items were mixed with the suspected data composed of 22 numeric items. However, the 10 (= k) numeric items were collected and so the value consistency can be computed from the suspected numeric data to declare the ownership.
On the other hand, what if the protected numeric data are increased unlawfully with some other numeric data when numeric data stored at the far end? For example, 1000 protected numeric items are increased to be 1050 ones. At this time, when performing Algorithm 4 for data recovery and self-authentication, the 1050 numeric items will be taken as the input to Algorithm 4, where k is accordingly set as 1050. However, it is noted that, in the encoding phase of Algorithm 3, since the original number of the input numeric items is 1000, the k was set as 1000. Therefore, when performing Algorithm 4, the phenomenon of value consistency will not be obtained. As a result, authorized users will be alerted to the abnormal change occurring to the accessed numeric data, achieving the purpose of confirming the correctness and authenticity of numeric data stored at the far end.
Condition 2. In the case of protected numeric data being decreased − When numeric data stored at the far end and Algorithm 4 being performed, the value consistency will not be computed from the decreased numeric data because of the loss of the k + 1 shares. Therefore, the data accessor will be alerted that the reconstructed result is incorrect, accomplishing the designed function of self-authentication.
On the other hand, when data leakage occurring, since the k + 1 shares yielded by the proposed (k, k + 1)-threshold method have been lost and cannot be collected completely, there is no right witness that can be extracted from the decreased numeric data to declare the partial ownership. To remedy this situation, the way of reducing the authentication precision of the numeric data mentioned previously also works. For example, again, assume the number of to-beprotected numeric items N is 100, and now N is divided into two parts. Then, each part composed of 50 numeric items is input to Algorithm 3 in the formulation of (50, 51)-threshold self-authentication method. As a result, the resulting protected numeric data and two (k + 1)-th shares are generated. Here the two (k + 1)-th partial shares are respectively used for the two parts divided from the input N (=100) numeric items. In this manner, when the protected numeric data are decreased and leaked out, it is still possible to extract the value consistency from the remaining numeric data. For example, in case of 100 protected numeric items being decreased to be 80 ones and then leaked out, as long as 50 numeric items constituting one part remain intact among the leaked 80 ones, the value consistency can be extracted from the leaked numeric items to prove the partial ownership.
Following the logic of the flexible solution described above, a user may divide the to-be-protected numeric data into the certain number of parts as needed for maintaining the effect of our method on the condition of protected data being decreased.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new multipurpose protection method for numeric data which is able to authenticate the correctness of the numeric data restored from the protected version and to declare the ownership for leaked protected numeric data has been proposed. The proposed method transforms to-be-protected numeric data into another normal but fake values to decrease the suspicion from malicious users and simultaneously forbid them to obtain the true values of protected numeric data. The true values of protected numeric data may be easily recovered by reverse transformation process of (k, k + 1)-threshold method. Furthermore, by checking the existence of value consistency explored in this study, the correctness and validity of recovered numeric data may be confirmed as well.
For leaked numeric data that are possibly stolen or unauthorized copied from clouds, the proposed method may extract the fact of value consistency from the suspected leaked numeric data to declare the ownership. Measures for reinforcing the security of the protected numeric data and the corresponding security analysis are also proposed. Experimental results have been shown to prove the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method. Future works may be directed to choices of related parameters including values of k, n and prime number p to develop the capabilities of exact localization and recovery of the tampering.
